IRIX rmail system() and LOGNAME hole
Description: | rmail is setgid mail and apparently does a system() involving the contents of untrusted user environmental variable LOGNAME. Duh. |
Author: | Yuri Volobuev <volobuev@T1.CHEM.UMN.EDU> |
Compromise: | Group mail, the uses of this are obvious |
Vulnerable Systems: | IRIX, 5.3, 6.2, possibly 6.3 |
Date: | 7 May 1997 |
Notes: | Too bad Yuri Volobuev is retiring. There wouldn't be a IRIX section without him. Good job Yuri! |
te: Wed, 7 May 1997 05:48:00 -0500
From: Yuri Volobuev <volobuev@T1.CHEM.UMN.EDU>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Irix: misc
[...]
7. Rmail
This one is ridiculous. /usr/bin/rmail is sgid mail. Man page clearly
says
rmail is only required by UUCP, still, it's installed everywhere. It's
also
been known to have bugs for years, which SGI has addressed by a series of
patches. Quite unfortunately, all of them fail to fix the problem
completely, including the most recent one, 1639 (for 6.2, it has brothers
for other releases). It's a small and simple program, it just passes
slightly modified message from stdin to sendmail, as usually via virtue of
system(). Why it takes several shots to fix it, I just don't understand.
To exploit, set LOGNAME env to something like blah;mycommand.
Fortunately,
it syslogs all invocations of itself, so at least you'll know when someone
is doing something bad. Remove sgid bit from it.
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