Linux sliplogin hole
Description: | sliplogin does system() as root w/o clearing environment, so you can do things like set IFS='/'. |
Author: | David Holland <dholland@hcs.HARVARD.EDU> |
Compromise: | root (local) |
Vulnerable Systems: | Any with sliplogin older than 2.1.0, mostly linux systems (many BSD distributions have the program, but it apparently can't be exploited to another error). |
Date: | 16 July 1996 |
Exploit:
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 1996 15:27:19 -0500
From: David Holland
To: Multiple recipients of list BUGTRAQ
Subject: [linux-security] sliplogin
Anyone running a version of sliplogin older than sliplogin-2.1.0
(which can be gotten from sunsite.unc.edu:/pub/Linux/system/Network/serial
or ftp.uk.linux.org:/pub/linux/Networking/transports) should remove it
or upgrade it immediately.
It does
setuid(0);
if (s = system(logincmd)) {
:
}
without clearing the environment first. Therefore, anybody can get
root trivially.
The sliplogin from NetKit-B-0.06 is affected.
Current RedHat sliplogin is not affected.
Others I don't know about.
--
- David A. Holland | Number of words in the English language that
dholland@hcs.harvard.edu | exist because of typos or misreadings: 381
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